BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Ashoka University - ECPv6.17.4//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Ashoka University
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://www.ashoka.edu.in
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Ashoka University
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Kolkata
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0530
TZOFFSETTO:+0530
TZNAME:IST
DTSTART:20230101T000000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240904T134000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240904T145000
DTSTAMP:20240904T022308Z
CREATED:20240904T022130Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240904T022308Z
UID:62082-1725457200-1725461400@www.ashoka.edu.in
SUMMARY:Economics Department Weekly Seminar
DESCRIPTION:Dear All\, \nThe Department of Economics invites you to their weekly seminar on Wednesday\, September 4th\, 2024. \nTime: 1:40 PM to 2:50 PM \nVenue: AC04-301 \nSpeaker:  Aditya Vijay Kuvalekar \nTitle: “Similarity of Information in Games” (joint work with Deepal Basak and Joyee Deb) \nAbstract: We propose a class of stochastic orders\, CAD\, defined using conditional distributions\, to compare interdependence of joint distributions. We show that for binary action\, symmetric\, separable games\, and symmetric pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium\, increase in the similarity of information in the CAD order expands (shrinks) the equilibrium set when the game exhibits strategic complementarity (substitutability). We provide three different orders — weak\, strong\, and contour\, that establish the above relation for games with different payoff structures. Under additional assumptions\, we show that the reverse direction of this relation also holds true. \nWe look forward to having you with us. \n— \nRegards \nDepartment of Economics \nAshoka University \nWeb: www.ashoka.edu.in
URL:https://www.ashoka.edu.in/event/economics-department-weekly-seminar/
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR