Economics Weekly Seminar: Sonal Yadav
January 30 @ 1:30 pm - 2:40 pm
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Title: Matching with Partners and Projects
Browaldh Post Doctoral Fellow,
Umea School of Business, Economics and Statistics
Wednesday, January 30, 1:30 – 2:40pm
Venue: AC02 LR 105
Abstract: We study a model that is a hybrid of the classical one-sided and two sided roommate matching models. Agents are matched in pairs in order to undertake a project and have preferences over both the partner and the project they are assigned to. Each agent partitions the set of partners into friends and outsiders, and the set of possible projects, into good and bad ones (dichotomous preferences). The preference ordering on partner, project pairs is separable. Friendship is mutual and preferences over projects among friends are correlated. We propose an algorithm, the minimum demand priority algorithm that generates assignments in the weak core and is strategy-proof. The strong core may still fail to exist. Finally we show that our domain is maximal in the sense that the weak core fails to exist if any one of assumptions on the preferences is relaxed.