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Weekly Economics Seminar by Daniel Quigley

March 17 @ 6:30 pm - 7:40 pm

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Event Details

Title: Persuasion for the Long-Run [link to paper]

Speaker: Daniel Quigley, Associate Professor, Oxford University

Abstract: We examine persuasion when the desire for future credibility is the sole source of credibility today. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers who observe some public record of past feedback about accuracy. We use a geometric approach to provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which long-run incentives can efficiently substitute for ex-ante commitment when receivers observe all feedback; these conditions are not met in a large class of settings. We then show that coarse summary statistics of past feedback, like those used online, allow long-run incentives to perfectly substitute for commitment.

Details

Date:
March 17
Time:
6:30 pm - 7:40 pm

Organizer

Department of Economics
Website:
https://ashoka.edu.in/economics

Venue

Online
India + Google Map