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DTSTART;TZID="UTC-5.5":20210331T133000
DTEND;TZID="UTC-5.5":20210331T144000
DTSTAMP:20210513T210501
CREATED:20210330T060848
LAST-MODIFIED:20210330T063408
UID:27173-1617177600-1617181800@www.ashoka.edu.in
SUMMARY:Weekly Economics Seminar by Hervé Moulin
DESCRIPTION: Title: Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining [link to paper]\n\n Speaker: Hervé Moulin\, Professor\, University of Glasgow \n\nAbstract: The guarantee of an anonymous mechanism is the worst-case welfare an agent can secure against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be\, and what type of mechanism achieves it? We address the worst-case design question in the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes. If n > p the uniform lottery is the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee; there are many more if p > n\, in particular\, the ones inspired by the random dictator mechanism and by voting by veto. If n = 2 the maximal set M(n; p) is a simple polytope where each vertex combines a round of vetos with one of random dictatorship. If p > n ≥ 3 it is a simplicial complex of dimension d = \ceil((p-1)/d);\, that we describe in detail only when d = 1. The dual veto and random dictator guarantees\, together with the uniform one\, are the building blocks of 2^d simplexes of dimension d in M(n; p). Their vertices are guarantees easy to interpret and implement.\n
URL:https://www.ashoka.edu.in/events/event/weekly-economics-seminar-by-herve-moulin/
LOCATION:India
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