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Weekly Economics Seminar by Sushil Bikhchandani

March 4 @ 1:30 pm - 2:40 pm

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Event Details

Title: Selling Identical Objects

Speaker: Sushil Bikhchandani, Professor of Economics, Anderson School of Management, UCLA

Abstract: We investigate optimal selling mechanisms for identical objects. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values and (ii) increasing marginal values. Thus, buyer values are neither additive nor independent. With decreasing marginal values, we show that under a sufficient condition it is optimal to sell the first unit deterministically. We describe other properties of optimal mechanisms and use these results to show that for two units and the uniform prior there is an optimal mechanism that is deterministic. With increasing marginal values, the optimal mechanism for selling two units is deterministic and involves bundling under the same sufficient condition.


March 4
1:30 pm - 2:40 pm


Department of Economics


AC 02 LR 105