Dear All,

The Department of Economics invites you to their weekly seminar on Wednesday, October 25th, 2023.

Time: 1:40 PM to 2:50 PM

Venue: AC04-301

Speaker: Siddharth Chatterjee

Title: “Two–person zero–sum games without expected utility preferences: A proposal”

Abstract:  A solution concept for two–person zero–sum games is proposed with only the Independence axiom assumed of players’ preferences. Each player is shown to admit a set of admissible strategies assuring minimum guarantees. Rationality requires agents to reject non–admissible strategies in further considerations. Knowledge assumptions imply iterated elimination of non–admissible strategies resulting in surviving sets whose cross product are consideration equilibria. Consideration equilibria always exist and include Nash equilibria if any. Consideration equilibria and Nash equilibria (or, minimax strategies) coincide if preferences are further known to satisfy continuity.

We look forward to having you with us.

Thanks & Regards
Department of Economics