Event Calendar

Loading Events

Inclusion for Entrenchment: How Ruling Parties Subvert Electoral Quotas

POL Colloquium

Participation, contestation, and inclusion are regarded as mutually reinforcing pillars of democracy, yet institutional designs can generate trade-offs among them. Drawing on 180,432 Panchayat-level elections in West Bengal, India, we show that electoral quotas for marginalized groups reduce voter turnout and electoral competition, with especially pronounced effects under intersectional quotas. We trace these effects to institutional choices of partisan local elections and indirect executive selection, which create incentives and opportunities for ruling parties to capture reserved seats. Ruling parties suppress rival and internal contestation through coercion and co-optation. A survey experiment demonstrates how coercion induces voter exit. Our findings reveal how institutions designed to expand political inclusion can, under certain conditions, facilitate ruling-party control. This contributes to debates on electoral quotas, elite capture, and the institutional foundations of subnational authoritarianism within democracies.